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Abstract
Critical-level generalized-utilitarian population principles with positive critical levels pro-
vide an ethically attractive way of avoiding the repugnant conclusion. We discuss the
axiomatic foundations of critical-level generalized utilitarianism and investigate its rela-
tionship to the sadistic and strong sadistic conclusions. A positive critical level avoids
the repugnant conclusion. We demonstrate that, although no critical-level generalized-
utilitarian principle can avoid both the repugnant and strong sadistic conclusions, princi-
ples that avoid both have significant defects.
Keywords: Population Ethics, Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism, Repugnant Con-
clusion.
1. Introduction
Population principles extend fixed-population social goodness relations so that they can
rank alternatives with different populations and population sizes. Most of the popula-
tion principles commonly discussed are welfarist: the ranking of any pair of alternatives
depends on the well-being of those alive in the two alternatives only. Thus, information
about all those who ever live together with their levels of lifetime utility (interpreted
as individual indicators of lifetime well-being) is sufficient to establish a welfarist social
ranking. Furthermore, these population principles are typically anonymous: information
about individual identities is not needed. Anonymity provides a solution to Parfit’s [1984]
‘non-identity problem’ and ensures that individual interests receive equal treatment.
Because information about well-being plays such an important role in welfarist prin-
ciples, it is important to couple them with a comprehensive account of well-being such as
that of Griffin [1986] or of Sumner [1996]. In addition, the interpretation of individual
utilities as indicators of lifetime well-being is essential to avoid counter-intuitive recom-
mendations regarding the termination of lives.
In order to investigate the ethical properties of population principles, it is important to
know the level of well-being that represents neutrality. We follow the standard convention
and identify a neutral life with a lifetime-utility level of zero. See, for example, Blackorby,
Bossert and Donaldson [1997, 2002] or Broome [1993] for discussions of neutrality and its
normalization.
Within the class of welfarist population principles, variable-population extensions
of fixed-population utilitarianism play a dominant role. Fixed-population utilitarianism
ranks any two alternatives with the same individuals alive in both by comparing their total
or average utilities. There are many ways of extending fixed-population utilitarianism to a
variable-population framework, and we call a population principle whose fixed-population
subprinciples are utilitarian a same-number utilitarian principle. Standard examples are
classical utilitarianism and average utilitarianism. Classical utilitarianism ranks any two
alternatives by comparing their total utilities, whereas average utilitarianism employs av-
erage utilities instead. Other examples include number-dampened utilitarianism which
uses average utility multiplied by a positive-valued function of population size to rank
alternatives. Classical utilitarianism is obtained if this function is proportional to popula-
tion size, and average utilitarianism results if the function is constant. See Ng [1986] and,
for variations and further discussions, Arrhenius [2000], Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson
[2001], Carlson [1998], Hurka [2000] and Sider [1991].
Critical-level utilitarianism (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995, 1997, 2002] and
Blackorby and Donaldson [1984]) is another class of principles which generalizes classical
utilitarianism (but not average utilitarianism). It uses the sum of the differences between
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individual utility levels and a fixed critical level to make comparisons.1 If the critical
level is zero, classical utilitarianism results. For each value of the critical-level constant, a
different principle is obtained.
Critical-level generalized utilitarianism makes same-number comparisons by using the
sum of transformed utilities, where the transformation can be any continuous and increas-
ing function. For convenience, we consider only transformations that preserve the level
of utility representing neutrality; this involves no loss of generality. If the transforma-
tion is chosen to be (strictly) concave, (strict) inequality aversion obtains as a property
of the principle. Broome [2002] argues that generalized-utilitarian orderings with strictly
concave transformations provide the best fit with Parfit’s [1997] ‘prioritarianism’ (see also
Fleurbaey [2002]). A same-number generalized-utilitarian principle is any principle whose
same-number subprinciples are generalized-utilitarian.
Parfit [1976, 1982, 1984] criticizes classical utilitarianism on the grounds that it im-
plies the repugnant conclusion. A population principle implies the repugnant conclusion
if and only if, for any population size, for any positive level of utility and for any level of
utility between zero and the previous level, there exists a larger population size such that
an alternative where everyone in the larger population has the lower level of utility is bet-
ter than the alternative with the smaller population and the higher utility for everyone.2
The higher utility level can be arbitrarily large and the lower utility level can be arbitrar-
ily close to zero, the level that represents a neutral life. The generalized counterpart of
classical utilitarianism suffers from the same problem.
There are many classes of principles that avoid the repugnant conclusion. The purpose
of this paper is to defend the critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles with positive
critical levels as the ones that avoid it in the most ethically attractive way.
Arrhenius [2000] introduces two versions of the sadistic conclusion and argues that it
should be avoided as well. A principle implies the sadistic conclusion if and only the addi-
tion of individuals with negative utilities can lead to a better alternative than the addition
of a possibly different number of individuals with positive utilities to a utility-unaffected
initial population. The strong sadistic conclusion is implied if and only if, for any alter-
native in which everyone’s utility is negative, there exists a worse alternative in which
everyone’s utility is positive. We argue that the requirement that the sadistic conclusion
be avoided is too strong: virtually all same-number generalized-utilitarian principles imply
it.
The critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles have an important property called
existence independence: rankings of alternatives are independent of both the utilities and
number of unaffected individuals. There are, however, no population principles that satisfy
1 Fixed critical levels are proposed by Parfit [1976, 1982, 1984].
2 Parfit’s statement of the repugnant conclusion is somewhat weaker.
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this axiom together with several basic axioms and avoid the strong sadistic and repugnant
conclusions.3 We therefore investigate several principles that avoid the repugnant and
strong sadistic conclusions and satisfy the basic axioms. In particular, we discuss the re-
stricted critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles. Like all other principles with the
same properties, including restricted or unrestricted number-dampened generalized utili-
tarianism (Hurka [2000], Ng [1986]), these principles fail to satisfy existence independence.
Using an example, we argue that principles that violate this axiom are inconsistent with
widely held ethical intuitions.
In Section 2, we introduce critical-level generalized utilitarianism and discuss its ax-
iomatic foundation. The repugnant conclusion, the sadistic conclusion and the strong
sadistic conclusion are discussed in Section 3, along with a result that specifies the critical
levels that allow critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles to avoid each of them. Sec-
tion 4 presents and discusses restricted critical-level generalized utilitarianism and Section
5 concludes.
2. Critical-level generalized utilitarianism
A population principle ranks alternatives according to their social goodness. We assume
that each social alternative is associated with a full description of all features that may
be relevant to the ranking. In particular, all determinants of individual well-being are
included. The goodness ranking is assumed to be an ordering, that is, a reflexive, transitive
and complete at-least-as-good-as relation. Reflexivity requires every alternative to be
ranked as at least as good as itself. Transitivity ensures that the ranking is consistent
in the sense that, if one alternative is at least as good as a second which, in turn, is at
least as good as a third, then the first is at least as good as the third. Finally, a relation
is complete if and only if any two distinct alternatives are ranked. Two alternatives are
equally good if and only if each is at least as good as the other. Alternative x is better
than alternative y if and only x is at least as good as y and y is not as least as good as x.
We restrict attention to welfarist principles, each of which is equivalent to a single
ordering defined on utility distributions. One alternative is at least as good as another
if and only if the utility distribution corresponding to the first is at least as good as the
distribution corresponding to the second.
A utility distribution consists of the utility levels of all the people who ever live in
the corresponding alternative. Because we consider anonymous principles only, it is not
necessary to keep track of individual identities. Consequently, the utility levels in an
alternative can be numbered from one to the number of individuals alive. Thus, if there
3 For further discussions, see Arrhenius [2000], Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey [1998],
Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2001], Blackorby and Donaldson [1991] and Ng [1989].
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are n people alive in an alternative, a utility distribution is an n-tuple u = (u1, . . . , un)
where each number in the list is the utility level of one of the members of society.
A welfarist population principle can be described by an at-least-as-good-as ordering
of utility distributions. The corresponding equal-goodness and betterness relations are
defined as above: utility distribution u is as good as utility distribution v if and only if u is
at least as good as v and v is at least as good as u; and u is better than v if and only if u is
at least as good as v and it is not the case that v is at least as good as u. In order to be a
population principle, the ordering must be capable of different-number comparisons: any
two distributions u = (u1, . . . , un) and v = (v1, . . . , vm) are ranked, even if the population
sizes n and m are different.
Because the principles we investigate are anonymous, if we relabel the utility levels
in a utility distribution u, the resulting distribution is as good as u. Such a relabeling is
called a permutation of a utility distribution. A permutation of u = (u1, . . . , un) is a utility
distribution v = (v1, . . . , vn) such that there exists a way of matching each index i in u to
exactly one index j in v such that ui = vj . For example, (u2, u1, u3) is a permutation of
(u1, u2, u3). Anonymity is defined as follows.
Anonymity: For all population sizes n, for all utility distributions u = (u1, . . . , un) and
v = (v1, . . . , vn), if v is a permutation of u, then u and v are equally good.
We also assume that the ordering satisfies the strong Pareto principle. It requires
unanimity to be respected.
Strong Pareto: For all population sizes n and for all utility distributions u = (u1, . . . , un)
and v = (v1, . . . , vn), if ui ≥ vi for all i = 1, . . . , n with at least one strict inequality, then
u is better than v.
Continuity is a condition that prevents the goodness relation from exhibiting ‘large’
changes in response to ‘small’ changes in the utility distribution.
Continuity: For all population sizes n, for all utility distributions u = (u1, . . . , un)
and v = (v1, . . . , vn) and for all sequences of utility distributions u1, u2, . . . where uj =
(uj1, . . . , u
j
n) for all j,
(a) if the sequence u1, u2, . . . approaches v and uj is at least as good as u for all j, then
v is at least as good as u;
(b) if the sequence u1, u2, . . . approaches v and u is at least as good as uj for all j, then
u is at least as good as v.
All of the above properties impose restrictions on same-number comparisons only and
they are well established and accepted in the literature on same-number social evaluation.
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To establish a link between utility distributions with different population sizes, we impose
two further conditions. The first requires that well-being and population size can be traded
off in at least a rudimentary way.
Weak existence of critical levels: There exist a utility distribution u = (u1, . . . , un)
and a utility level c such that u = (u1, . . . , un) and (u, c) = (u1, . . . , un, c) are equally
good.
A critical level for a utility distribution u is a utility level such that, if an individual
with the critical level is added to u, all other utilities unchanged, the augmented distri-
bution and the original are equally good. Although the above axiom only requires the
existence of a critical level for a single utility distribution, it does not require critical levels
to exist for others. If critical levels exist, they may depend on both the number of people
alive and their utilities. If strong Pareto is satisfied, each utility distribution can have
at most one critical level: given transitivity, the assumption that there are two distinct
critical levels immediately contradicts strong Pareto.
Finally, we introduce an independence condition. It requires the ranking of any two
alternatives to be independent of the existence of individuals who ever live and have
the same utility levels in both. It allows population principles to be applied to affected
individuals only.
Existence independence: For all utility distributions u = (u1, . . . , un), v = (v1, . . . , vm)
and w = (w1, . . . , wr), the utility distribution (u, w) is at least as good as the utility
distribution (v, w) if and only if u is at least as good as v.
To illustrate the condition, consider the following example (see Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [2001]). Suppose that, in the near future, a small group of humans leaves Earth
on a space ship and, after travelling through space for several generations, establishes a
colony on a planet that belongs to a distant star. The colonists lose all contact with Earth
soon after their departure and, in all possible alternatives, the two groups have nothing to
do with each other from then on. No decision made by the members of either group can
affect the other in any way. Now suppose that the colonists are considering an important
decision for their society and want to know which of the associated alternatives is best. If
the population principle satisfies existence independence, the individuals that remained on
Earth and their descendants can be disregarded: the ranking of the feasible alternatives is
independent of their existence and, therefore, of both their number and their utility levels.
In this case, the population principle can be applied to the colonists alone.
We find existence independence ethically attractive because of examples such as this.
In the presence of anonymity, existence independence cannot be reserved for particular
groups: if it applies to groups such as the long dead, it must apply to all groups. Existence
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independence is attractive for practical reasons as well. Information about the number
and utility levels of the long dead or of future people whose existence and well-being
are unaffected by decisions taken in the present is very difficult to obtain. The same
observation applies to the spaceship example: it is impossible for the colonists to gather
reliable information about the number of individuals on Earth and their utilities.
Two classes of principles that are of particular interest in this paper are the critical-
level utilitarian principles and their generalized counterparts. According to critical-level
utilitarianism, there exists a fixed critical level of utility α such that a utility distribution
u = (u1, . . . , un) is at least as good as a utility distribution v = (v1, . . . , vm) if and only if
the sum of the differences between the utility levels in u and α is no less than the sum of
differences between the utility levels in v and α. That is,
[u1 − α] + . . .+ [un − α] ≥ [v1 − α] + . . .+ [vm − α].
Critical-level generalized utilitarianism uses a continuous and increasing transforma-
tion g applied to the individual utilities instead of the utilities themselves to establish the
social ranking. According to these principles, utility distribution u = (u1, . . . , un) is at
least as good as distribution v = (v1, . . . , vm) if and only if
[g(u1)− g(α)] + . . .+ [g(un)− g(α)] ≥ [g(v1)− g(α)] + . . .+ [g(vm)− g(α)] (1)
where, as before, α is the fixed critical level. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
the transformation g preserves the utility level representing neutrality, that is, it satisfies
g(0) = 0.
Same-number generalized-utilitarian principles give priority to worse-off individuals
if and only if the transformation g is strictly concave. Suppose that a single person is
to be chosen to receive a one-unit increase in his or her utility level. According to any
of these principles, the best choice is the worst-off person, the second-best choice is the
second-worst-off person, and so on (if two people have the same utility level, either can be
chosen). Thus, strict priority is given to worse-off individuals.
The critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles are the only ones that satisfy the
above axioms. This result, which is proved in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1998],
provides a strong case in their favour.4
Theorem 1: A welfarist population principle satisfies anonymity, strong Pareto, con-
tinuity, weak existence of critical levels and existence independence if and only if it is
critical-level generalized-utilitarian.
4 See also Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995] for an intertemporal formulation. An alternative
characterization can be found in Blackorby and Donaldson [1984].
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3. The repugnant and sadistic conclusions
A population principle implies the repugnant conclusion (Parfit [1976, 1982, 1984]) if pop-
ulation size can always be substituted for quality of life, no matter how close to neutrality
the well-being of a large population is. That is, there are situations where mass poverty
is considered preferable to alternatives where fewer people lead very good lives. An in-
formal definition of the repugnant conclusion is given in the introduction. The following
formulation makes it more precise.
Repugnant conclusion: For any population size n, for any positive utility level ξ and
for any utility level ε strictly between zero and ξ, there exists a population size m > n
such that a utility distribution in which each of m individuals has the utility level ε is
better than a utility distribution in which each of n individuals has a utility of ξ.
The sadistic conclusion, introduced by Arrhenius [2000], refers to the comparison
of two alternatives both of which are obtained by population expansions. The sadistic
conclusion is implied if and only if it may be better to add people with negative utilities
to a utility-unaffected population than adding a possibly different number of people with
positive utility to the same utility-unaffected population.
Sadistic conclusion: There exist utility distributions u = (u1, . . . , un), v = (v1, . . . , vm)
and w = (w1, . . . , wr) such that all utilities in v are negative, all utilities in w are positive
and the distribution (u, v) is better than the distribution (u, w).
The strong sadistic conclusion obtains if and only if, for every utility distribution of
negative utilities, there exists a worse utility distribution of positive utilities.
Strong sadistic conclusion: For any utility distribution u = (u1, . . . , un) containing
negative utilities only, there exists a utility distribution v = (v1, . . . , vm) with positive
utilities only such that u is better than v.
Clearly, the sadistic conclusion does not imply the strong sadistic conclusion; for
example, critical-level utilitarianism with the critical level α = 0, which is classical utili-
tarianism, leads to the sadistic conclusion but not to the strong sadistic conclusion. Con-
versely, the strong sadistic conclusion does not imply the sadistic conclusion. Define a value
function V by letting V (u) = −u1 if the utility distribution u has exactly one component
u1, and V (u) = u1 + . . . + un if the utility distribution u has at least two components.
The goodness relation is defined by declaring one utility distribution to be at least as good
as another if and only if the value of V for the first is greater than or equal to the value
of V for the second. This ordering leads to the strong sadistic conclusion because, for
any utility distribution u = (u1, . . . , un) containing negative utilities only, the distribution
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v = v1 = (−1)(u1 + . . . + un − 1) which contains positive utilities only is worse. The
sadistic conclusion is avoided because any two utility distributions (u, v) and (u, w) each
have at least two components and, therefore, are compared according to total utility. But
total utility is always greater for (u, w) than for (u, v) if the components of v are negative
and those of w are positive.
The above example fails to satisfy the strong Pareto principle. If strong Pareto is
added, the strong sadistic conclusion is stronger than the sadistic conclusion. We obtain
Theorem 2: If a principle satisfies strong Pareto and the strong sadistic conclusion,
then it satisfies the sadistic conclusion.
Proof. Suppose strong Pareto and the strong sadistic conclusion are satisfied. Consider
a utility distribution u = (u1, . . . , un) with at least two individuals such that all utilities
are negative. By the strong sadistic conclusion, there exists a utility distribution v =
(v1, . . . , vm) with positive utilities only that is worse than u. We can distinguish two cases.
(i) m > 1. Because un is negative, strong Pareto implies that (u1, . . . , un−1, 0) is
better than u = (u1, . . . , un−1, un). Analogously, because vm is positive, strong Pareto
implies that v = (v1, . . . , vm−1, vm) is better than (v1, . . . , vm−1, 0). Because u is better
than v, transitivity implies that (u1, . . . , un−1, 0) is better than (v1, . . . , vm−1, 0). This
means that adding the utility distribution (u1, . . . un−1) with negative utilities only to (0)
is better than adding the utility distribution (v1, . . . , vm−1), which has positive utilities
only, to (0). Thus, the sadistic conclusion is implied.
(ii) m = 1. In this case, v has a single positive component v1. By strong Pareto,
v = (v1) is better than (−v1). The strong sadistic conclusion implies that there ex-
ists a utility distribution w = (w1, . . . , wr) with positive utilities only that is worse than
(−v1). Strong Pareo implies that r 6= 1 and thus r > 1. Because u is better than v,
v = (v1) is better than (−v1) and (−v1) is better than w, transitivity implies that u
is better than w. Analogously to the argument used in case (i), strong Pareto implies
that (u1, . . . , un−1, 0) is better than u = (u1, . . . , un−1, un) and w = (w1, . . . , wr−1, wr)
is better than (w1, . . . , wr−1, 0). Because u is better than w, transitivity implies that
(u1, . . . , un−1, 0) is better than (w1, . . . , wr−1, 0). This means that adding the utility dis-
tribution (u1, . . . un−1) with negative utilities only to (0) is better than adding the utility
distribution (w1, . . . , wr−1), which has positive utilities only, to (0). Thus, again, the
sadistic conclusion is implied.
The following theorem identifies the values for the critical level α such that the corre-
sponding critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles avoid each of the above conclusions.
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Theorem 3: (i) A critical-level generalized-utilitarian principle implies the repugnant
conclusion if and only if the critical level α is non-positive.
(ii) A critical-level generalized-utilitarian principle implies the sadistic conclusion if
and only if the critical level α is non-zero.
(iii) A critical-level generalized-utilitarian principle implies the strong sadistic con-
clusion if and only if the critical level α is positive.
Proof. (i) Suppose α is non-positive. Let n be any population size, let ξ be any positive
level of utility, and let ε be a utility level strictly between zero and ξ. Letm be a population
size such that
m > n
[
g(ξ)− g(α)
g(ε)− g(α)
]
. (2)
Because ξ > ε, α is non-positive and g is increasing, the ratio [g(ξ)− g(α)]/[g(ε)− g(α)]
is greater than one and, by (2), m is greater than n. Multiplying both sides of (2) by the
positive difference g(ε)− g(α), we obtain
m[g(ε)− g(α)] > n[g(ξ)− g(α)]
and the utility distribution where m people each have utility ε is better than the distribu-
tion where n people each have utility ξ. Thus, the repugnant conclusion is implied.
Conversely, suppose α is positive. Let n = 1, ξ = 2α and ε = α/2. Substituting
these values, for any population size m > n, an alternative where m people have utility
ε is better than an alternative where n people have utility ξ according to critical-level
generalized utilitarianism if and only if
m[g(ε)− g(α)] = m[g(α/2)− g(α)] > n[g(ξ)− g(α)] = 1[g(2α)− g(α)] (3)
which is impossible for m > n = 1 and α > 0 because, in this case, the left side of (3) is
negative and the right side is positive. Therefore, the repugnant conclusion is avoided.
(ii) Suppose α is not equal to zero. Let u = (u1) = (α). If α is positive, let v = (v1) =
(−α/4) and w = (w1, w2) = (α/4, α/4). If α is negative, let v = (v1, v2) = (α/4, α/4)
and w = (w1) = (−α/4). In both cases, v contains negative utilities only and w contains
positive utilities only but (u, v) is better than (u, w) according to critical-level generalized
utilitarianism, which shows that the sadistic conclusion is implied.
Now suppose α is equal to zero. Let u = (u1, . . . , un), v = (v1, . . . , vm) and w =
(w1, . . . , wr) be utility distributions such that v contains negative components only, w
contains positive components only and there are no restrictions on the utilities in u. Ac-
cording to critical-level generalized utilitarianism with a zero critical level, (u, v) is better
than (u, w) if and only if
g(u1) + . . .+ g(un) + g(v1) + . . .+ g(vm) > g(u1) + . . .+ g(un) + g(w1) + . . .+ g(wr)
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which is equivalent to
g(v1) + . . .+ g(vm) > g(w1) + . . .+ g(wr).
Because all the values on the left side of this inequality are negative and all values on the
right side are positive, this is impossible and the sadistic conclusion is avoided.
(iii) Suppose α is positive and let u = (u1, . . . , un) contain negative utilities only. Let
m > [g(u1)− g(α)] + . . .+ [g(un)− g(α)]g(α/2)− g(α) (4)
and v = (v1, . . . , vm) = (α/2, . . . , α/2). Note that both numerator and denominator on
the right side of (4) are negative and, as a consequence, the quotient is positive. Then,
multiplying both sides by the negative difference g(α/2)− g(α), we obtain
[g(u1)−g(α)]+. . .+[g(un)−g(α)] > m[g(α/2)−g(α)] = [g(v1)−g(α)]+. . .+[g(vm)−g(α)]
and u is better than v according to critical-level generalized utilitarianism. Consequently,
the strong sadistic conclusion is implied.
Now suppose that α is non-positive and the strong sadistic conclusion is implied.
Let u = (u1, . . . , un) contain utilities that are less than α and, therefore, negative. By
the strong sadistic conclusion, there exists a utility distribution v = (v1, . . . , vm) which
contains positive utilities such that u is better than v. Thus, according to critical-level
generalized utilitarianism,
[g(u1)− g(α)] + . . .+ [g(un)− g(α)] > [g(v1)− g(α)] + . . .+ [g(vm)− g(α)]. (5)
By construction, each term on the left side of (5) is negative and each term on the right side
is positive, and a contradiction is obtained. Consequently, the strong sadistic conclusion
is not implied when α is non-positive.
Theorem 3 implies that it is not possible for a critical-level generalized-utilitarian
principle to avoid both the strong sadistic and repugnant conclusions: avoidance of the
repugnant conclusion requires the critical level to be positive but the strong sadistic con-
clusion is avoided only if the critical level is non-positive.
That result is related to another concerning the repugnant and sadistic conclusions.
Any same-number utilitarian principle which ranks no one-person alternative above all
those with larger populations cannot avoid both the sadistic and repugnant conclusions
(Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2001, Theorem 1]). The condition on one-person
alternatives is implied by existence of critical levels. Consequently, all of those principles
that avoid the repugnant conclusion necessarily imply the sadistic conclusion. This occurs
because avoidance of the sadistic conclusion requires the addition of any number of people
at a positive but arbitrarily small utility level to be ranked as no worse than the addition
10
of a single person at an arbitrarily small negative utility level. Because we consider the
repugnant conclusion unacceptable, we conclude that avoidance of the sadistic conclusion
is an axiom that must be discarded.
4. Restricted critical-level principles
Although the axiom avoidance of the sadistic conclusion can be rejected, it may be argued
that avoidance of the strong sadistic conclusion should not. That requires distributions
with positive utilities only to be ranked as no worse than distributions with negative
utilities only. Together with Theorem 1, Theorem 3 implies that there is no population
principle that satisfies anonymity, strong Pareto, continuity, weak existence of critical
levels and existence independence that avoids the repugnant conclusion and the strong
sadistic conclusion. If avoidance of the strong sadistic conclusion is regarded as desirable,
therefore, one of the other requirements must be dropped. Given the fundamental nature
of anonymity, strong Pareto, continuity and weak existence of critical levels, the obvious
candidate is existence independence.
There are principles that are closely related to the critical-level generalized-utilitarian
principles with positive critical levels. They are the restricted critical-level generalized-
utilitarian principles (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2001]) and they satisfy anonymity,
strong Pareto, continuity and weak existence of critical levels and, furthermore, they avoid
both the repugnant conclusion and the strong sadistic conclusion. The positive critical level
for a critical-level generalized-utilitarian principle becomes the critical-level parameter for
the corresponding restricted principle. However, this parameter is no longer equal to the
critical level for all utility distributions.
Each of the restricted critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles employs a value
function which is equal to the left side of equation (1) when average transformed utilities
are greater than g(α), equal to the percentage shortfall of average transformed utility
from g(α) when average transformed utility is positive and less than or equal to g(α), and
equal to total transformed utility less one when average transformed utility is non-positive.
Consequently, all utility distributions whose average transformed utilities are above g(α)
are better than all whose average transformed utilities are positive and no greater than
it and these utility distributions are, in turn, better than all whose average transformed
utilities are non-positive. Critical levels are equal to α for all utility distributions in the first
group. In the second group, the transformed critical level is equal to average transformed
utility. For the third group, critical levels are equal to zero.
The restricted critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles satisfy anonymity, strong
Pareto, continuity, weak existence of critical levels and they avoid both the repugnant and
the strong sadistic conclusions. They are not the only ones that satisfy the axioms on the
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above list: restricted number-dampened generalized utilitarianism (Hurka [2000]), which
is a modification of number-dampened generalized utilitarianism (Ng [1986]) has those
properties as well.
All of the restricted principles fail to satisfy existence independence. This is, in our
view, a significant problem which is best illustrated by an example. For simplicity, we em-
ploy same-number utilitarian principles; the example is easily adapted to their generalized
counterparts.
Suppose that a single parent has a handicapped child whose lifetime utility would
be zero (neutrality) without the expenditure of additional resources. Two alternatives are
available. In the first, which we call x, resources are devoted to improving the child’s well-
being, resulting in utilities of 50 for the child and 60 for the parent. In the second, which
we call y, no additional resources are used to raise the level of well-being of the disabled
child, but a second child is born and the same resources are devoted to it resulting in
lifetime utility levels of 60 for the second child and the parent and zero for the first child.
The parent and his or her children are not the only people who ever live, however. There
are ten billion (10b) others who have the same utility levels in both alternatives. This
example, illustrated in Table 1, is due to Parfit [1976, 1982].
Parent First Child Second Child Utility Distribution of Others
x 60 50 (u1, . . . , u10b)
y 60 0 60 (u1, . . . , u10b)
Table 1
The parent wants to know which alternative is better. Parfit assumes that utility levels
other than those of people who are potentially affected are irrelevant. That assumption is
satisfied if critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles are used to rank the alternatives.
Their ranking of x and y is independent of the utility levels of the unconcerned and even
of their existence.
Classical utilitarianism ranks y as better than x, and this contradicts the moral
intuition of many. Critical-level utilitarianism agrees with this ranking if the critical level
is less than ten but, if the critical level is greater than ten, x is ranked as better. It is
interesting to note that the positive critical level that ensures this ranking also ensures
that the repugnant conclusion is avoided.
Suppose, by contrast, that restricted critical-level utilitarianism with a critical-level
parameter of 15 is used to rank the alternatives. In that case, the utility levels of the
unaffected other people make a difference. If their average utility is equal to 20, the two
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alternatives are ranked with critical-level utilitarianism with a critical level of 15 and x
is better than y. If the average utility of the others is 10, then average utility in both
alternatives is between zero and 15, x and y are ranked with average utilitarianism and,
again, x is better than y. But, if the average utility of the others is −5, average utilities
in both alternatives are negative. In that case, the alternatives are ranked with classical
utilitarianism and y is better than x. Restricted number-dampened utilitarianism (see
Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2001] and Hurka [2000]) suffers from the same problem
because it fails to satisfy existence independence.
5. Conclusion
Parfit [1976, 1982, 1984] argues that the repugnant conclusion should be avoided and
we concur. Arrhenius [2000] argues that the sadistic conclusion should also be avoided.
Because all same-number utilitarian principles that avoid the repugnant conclusion lead
to the sadistic conclusion, we reject it as an axiom.
Avoidance of the strong sadistic conclusion is an axiom that, at first glance, has
some ethical appeal. There are, however, no principles that satisfy anonymity, strong
Pareto, continuity, weak existence of critical levels and existence independence that avoid
both the repugnant conclusion and the sadistic conclusion. It is tempting, therefore, to
drop existence independence from the list of axioms. However, in that case, rankings of
alternatives may depend on the utilities of unaffected people such as the long dead. Our
intuitions tell us that such a dependence is ethically inappropriate and, for that reason, we
are prepared to drop avoidance of the strong sadistic conclusion. That leaves the critical-
level generalized-utilitarian principles with positive critical levels as the ones that avoid
the repugnant conclusion in the most ethically appropriate way.
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